We present a case (SE) with integrative visual agnosia following ischemic stroke affecting the right dorsal and the left ventral pathways of the visual system. Despite his inability to identify global hierarchical letters [Navon, D. (1977). Forest before trees: The precedence of global features in visual perception. Cognitive Psychology, 9,, and his dense object agnosia, SE showed normal global-to-local interference when responding to local letters in Navon hierarchical stimuli and significant picture-word identity priming in a semantic decision task for words. Since priming was absent if these features were scrambled, it stands to reason that these effects were not due to priming by distinctive features. The contrast between priming effects induced by coherent and scrambled stimuli is consistent with implicit but not explicit integration of features into a unified whole. We went on to show that possible/impossible object decisions were facilitated by words in a word-picture priming task, suggesting that prompts could activate perceptually integrated images in a backward fashion. We conclude that the absence of SE's ability to identify visual objects except through tedious serial construction reflects a deficit in accessing an integrated visual representation through bottom-up visual processing alone. However, top-down generated images can help activate these visual representations through semantic links.
Introduction
Visual agnosia is a modality-specific deficit in recognizing visually presented objects. Over a century ago, Lissauer (1890) suggested a distinction between apperceptive and associative agnosia, each representing a breakdown in different stages of the perceptual hierarchy. Lissauer viewed apperception as a deficit in the initial stages of sensory processing in which the perceptual representation is constructed, and association as a deficit in mapping the final structural representation onto stored knowledge. According to this differentiation, a patient with apperceptive agnosia would typically fail to copy or match basic visual stimuli, whereas an associative agnosic would experience "normal vision stripped of its meaning" (Lissauer, 1890). * Corresponding author. Tel.: +972 2 5881090; fax: +972 2 5825659.
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Although this classification has provided a simple and useful framework for dealing with visual disorders, it has not gone uncontested. Some neuropsychologists have cast doubt on the very concept of associative agnosia, claiming that underlying perceptual deficits can always be found in such cases if sensitive enough measurements are used (Delvenne, Seron, Coyette, & Rossion, 2004; Farah, 1990) . Others have argued that the classification is too coarse and insensitive to the complex stages characteristic of normal vision (Marr, 1982; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987; Ullman, 1996) . Indeed, variations in deficits reported across both apperceptive and associative visual agnosias have led to further divisions and refinements.
An important example for the purposes of the present paper is the case of a patient (HJA), clinically diagnosed with associative agnosia and found later to have apperceptive components. In their classic report, Riddoch and Humphreys (1987) experimentally tested this patient and found abnormal perceptual organization abilities. Specifically, HJA's difficulty resulted in
